

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0089

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MARCH 6 PRESENTATION AT MARCH 6

PLENARY SESSION

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE MARCH 6 PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR  
NEGOTIATIONS, THE ONLY STATEMENT WAS DELIVERED BY  
THE POLISH REP (STRULAK). IN HIS LENGTHY  
STATEMENT, STRULAK REVIEWED THE NOV. 8, 1973 EASTERN  
DRAFT AGREEMENT AND THEN OFFICIALLY ADVANCED, ON  
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BEHALF OF THE FOUR WARSAW PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THE

MODIFICATIONS TO THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP  
PROPOSAL PRESENTED AT THE FEB. 25 INFORMAL MEETING.  
THESE "AMENDEMENTS" TO THE NOV. 8 DRAFT AGREEMENT WERE  
PRESENTED IN THE SAME TERMS AS AT THE FEB 25 INFORMAL.  
STRULAK STATED THAT THE FREEZE AND OCT. 15, 1974  
INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSALS REMAINED ON THE TABLE,  
PARALLEL TO THE PROPOSAL JUST PUT FORWARD, THUS PROVIDING  
THE WEST WITH A RANGE OF CHOICE.

2. THE POLISH REP'S STATEMENT ALSO INCLUDED A  
POINTED CRITIQUE OF THE ALLIED POSITION. STRULAK  
TWICE DEFINED THE CENTRAL TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
AS THE SUBSTANTIAL MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES  
AND ARMAMENTS. STRULAK DEMANDED MUTUALITY AND  
RECIPROCITY OF OBLIGATIONS, SAID THAT THE  
PREPARATORY TALKS' COMMUNIQUE HAD DEALT WITH  
SUBSTANTIVE AS WELL AS PROCEDURAL ISSUES, AND  
CRITICIZED ALLIED EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE EXIST-  
ING CORRELATION OF FORCES AND THUS DECREASE THE  
PREVAILING DEGREE OF STABILITY. POLISH REP CHARGED THAT THE  
IDEA OF COMPENSATION, ADVANCED BY THE WEST, IS TANAMOUNT  
TO NATO UNILATERAL MILITARY GAINS AND HAS NO  
JUSTIFIED STANDING IN THE VIENNA TALKS. HE MADE ONE  
BRIEF REFERENCE TO WESTERN NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, SOME-  
WHAT UNUSUAL FOR POLISH STATEMENTS. STRULAK CLOSED BY  
SAYING THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST AGREE TO  
UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE FROM THE  
OUTSET. END SUMMARY.

3. THE TEXT OF THE POLISH STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

1. ENTERING THE SECOND MONTH OF THE FIFTH ROUND OF NEGO-  
TIATIONS, WE FEEL JUSTIFIED IN ASKING TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE  
OUR DISCUSSIONS CONTRIBUTED TO BRING US CLOSER TO THE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR TASK - SUBSTANTIAL MUTUAL REDUCTION  
OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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2. IF THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE INTEREST OF WESTERN  
STATES  
IN SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND  
COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN AS A PROMISING SYMPTOM, WHAT HAS  
FOLLOWED IN THEIR STATEMENTS MUST LEAD TO A DIFFERENT  
CONCLUSION.

3. WE CONTINUE TO HEAR THE KNOWN DEMANDS FOR REDUCTIONS  
SUBSTANTIAL ONLY ON THE PART OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES,  
LEADING TO THE INFREINGEMENT UPON THE EXISTING CORRELATION  
OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE PREVAILING DEGREE OF  
STABILITY, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF SOCIALIST STATES.

4. THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE ALSO CONTINUOUSLY CONFRONTED  
WITH THE WESTERN POSITION WHICH AMOUNTS TO THE VIRTUALLY  
INDEFINITE EXEMPTION FROM CLEAR-CUT REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS OF  
ALL BUT ONE DIRECT PARTICIPANT ON THE WESTERN SIDE, AND  
CONSEQUENTLY OF THE BULK OF THE NATO FORCES IN THE AREA.

5. THIS WESTERN ATTITUDE IS MAINTAINED DESPITE THE FACT  
THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND DISAVOWAL  
OF UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES IS BEING EVER MORE  
ACCLAIMED IN IMPORTANT EAST-WEST DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL  
CHARACTER, AND ESTABLISHES ITSELF AS A PARAMOUNT PRINCIPLE OF  
REGULATING THE POLITICO-MILITARY QUESTIONS BETWEEN STATES.

6. THE IMPORTANT MOVE TAKEN BY FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES  
IN NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1974 IN SUGGESTING THE JOINT COMMIT-  
MENT BY 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS  
NOT TO INCREASE THEIR ARMED FORCES MANPOWER IN CENTRAL  
EUROPE WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS LAST, HAS NOT BEEN ACCEPTED,  
EVEN THOUGH THE CLEARLY STATED INTENTION OF THIS MOVE WAS  
TO CURB THE ARMS RACE IN THE AREA AND SERVE AS THE USEFUL  
SPRINGBOARD FOR THE REDUCTION PROCESS.

7. NEXT TO THIS OVERTLY NEGATIVE APPROACH TO VARIOUS  
SOCIALIST PROPOSALS, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, FAR FROM DEMON-  
STRATING ANY FLEXIBILITY IN THE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO  
SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, KEEP DWELLING ON CONTROVERSIAL  
CONCEPTS.

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8. THE LONG REFUTED THEORY OF DISPARITIES IS NOW REVISED  
WITH AN AIM TO SUBSTANTIATE THE DUBIOUS DEMAND FOR  
COMPENSATIONS. THE RANGE OF FACTORS SUPPOSEDLY VALID IN  
FORMULATING SUCH A DEMAND IS BEING SELECTED AT WILL,  
WHILE THE TRULY VALID CONCERNs RAISED BY SOCIALIST COUNTRIES  
ARE BY-PASSED AND EVEN A PRIORI DENIED.

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9. IN PARTICULAR, THE SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR IS BEING BROUGHT INTO PICTURE. WE WITNESS ATTEMPTS TO DRAW US INTO THE DISCUSSION OBVIOUSLY GOING BEYOND THE AGREED AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND LEADING US AWAY FROM THE ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS THE SOLUTION OF THE CONCRETE PROBLEM OF SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS.

10. SUCH A WESTERN APPROACH CAN ONLY AUGMENT THE DOUBTS AS TO THE TRUE PURPOSE OF THIS TREND OF REASONING.

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11. THE IDEA OF COMPENSATIONS, ADVANCED BY THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, IS TANTAMOUNT TO UNILATERAL MILITARY GAINS

FOR THE NATO STATES. THEREFORE, IT HAS NO JUSTIFIED STANDING IN THESE TALKS.

12. INDEED, IS IT NECESSARY TO STRESS AGAIN THE BASIC POINT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, AND FOR THAT MATTER OF ANY INTER-NATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, VIZ. THAT CONCERNS OF THE PARTIES MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT RECIPROCALLY?

13. SUCH RECIPROCITY IS FORESEEN IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM, AND SPECIALLY IN THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENTS IN NOVEMBER 1973.

14. INDEED, AS THE COURSE OF OUR TALKS HAS TO-DATE DEMONSTRATED, THIS FOUR-POWER DRAFT REMAINS THE BEST AND MOST REALISTIC BASIS FOR PRODUCTIVE SEARCH OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS OF THE COMPLEX PROBLEM OF SUBSTANTIAL AND EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS.

15.5 WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN THE EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS PLAN AIMED AT AN OVERALL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF LOWERING THE HIGH CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

16. PERMIT ME ONCE AGAIN TO STRESS THE STIPULATIONS OF THIS DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS CONSIDER PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AND PERTINENT TO THE ELABORATION OF A WORKABLE PROGRAMME OF REDUCTIONS, SET BEFORE US AS THE AGREED OBJECTIVE OF THE VIENNA TALKS BY OUR GOVERNMENTS.

17. FIRSTLY, THE VIRTUE OF THE FOUR-POWER DRAFT AGREEMENT CONSISTS IN ITS PROVISION FOR THE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY MORE THAN 15 PERCENT WOULD MEAN THE WITHDRAWAL AND DEMOBILISATION DURING THE PERIOD OF 1975 - 1977 OF MANY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS TOGETHER WITH THEIR COMBAT EQUIPMENT. IT IS WORTH EMPHASIZING THAT TO DISMANTLE THIS SUBSTANTIAL

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PORTION OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD CONFORM TO THE NEEDS OF PROGRESSING DETENTE AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE SPECIFIED SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, LESS THAN THREE YEARS. STILL, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AMBITIOUS PLAN IS NOT BEYOND THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

18. SECONDLY, THE DRAFT AGREEMENT CONTAINS UNDERTAKINGS FOR MUTUAL, EQUITABLE AND HONEST CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE

PROCESS OF REDUCTION BY ALL 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE BASIC ASSUMPTION OF THIS PLAN WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IS TO PRESERVE THE HISTORICALLY FORMED BASIS OF SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND EUROPE AS A WHOLE. THE REDUCTION OF FORCES BY RELATIVELY MODEST NUMBERS ENVISAGED FOR 1975 WOULD PERMIT THE STATES BELONGING TO THE TWO MILITARY GROUPINGS TO GAIN EXPERIENCE AND ACQUAINT THEMSELVES WITH THE MODALITIES OF THE MORE ADVANCED PROGRAMME OF REDUCTIONS. THE SUBSEQUENT EQUAL PERCENTAGE-WISE CUTS ENVISAGED FOR 1976 AND 1977 WOULD ENSURE THE MUTUALITY AND EQUITY OF REDUCTIONS IN ARMED FORCES AND THEIR EQUIPMENT. THOSE WHO HAVE MORE FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WOULD HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE PROPORTIONATELY LARGER SHARE. WE SUBMIT THAT THIS IS THE METHOD WHICH COMPLIES WITH THE EXIGENCES OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

19. THIRDLY, THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE QUESTIN OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, PROPOSED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF FOUR SOCIALIST STATES, TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE OBJECTIVE REALITIES EXISTING IN CENTRAL EUROPE. NO MAJOR COMPONENT OF THE PRESENT MILITARY MIX IS LEFT OUT OF THE PROGRAMME OF REDUCTIONS. THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS, FORMING PART OF BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES, ARE TO BE COMPRISED. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SHOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT MILLIONS OF INHABITANTS OF DENSELY POPULATED AREAS OF CENTRAL EUROPE ARE EAGERLY AWAITING THE DECISION TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPNS ALONG WITH THE CONVENTIONAL MEANS OF WARFARE. THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS IS ALSO NECESSITATED BY A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATION, IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN THE EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES IN THE AREA.

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ACDA-05 BIB-01 ERDE-00 EB-07 /090 W

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20. IN VIEW OF THE DIFFERENT COMPOSITION AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY SYSTEMS, ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES, ARMS PRODUCTION CAPACITIES, INFRASTRUCTURAL NETWORKS, DEGREE OF SOPHISTICATION IN SYSTEMS OF COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION, AS WELL AS OTHER FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE THE EVALUATION OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA, ONLY THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS MAY SATISFY THE OBJECTIVE NEED OF RESPECTING THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE PARTIES AND PRESERVING THE SECURE STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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21. FOURTHLY, WE HAVE AMPLY DEMONSTRATED THAT OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT FULLY COMPLIES WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. THESE DECISIONS WENT BEYOND PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS SINCE THEY INTRODUCED THE PRINCIPLES OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, EQUITY OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, MUTUALITY OF UNDER-TAKINGS, WE WELL AS ESTABLISHED THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND FUTURE AGREEMENTS. THEY, IN FACT, CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATION

TO ANY AGREEMENT RESULTING FROM THESE TALKS.

22. LAST BUT NOT LEAST, THE DRAFT STATES IN REMARKABLY CLEAR AND PRECISE TERMS THE OBLIGATIONS OF ALL THE PARTIES AT EACH REDUCTION STAGE. WE SUGGEST AN EQUITABLE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE PRESENCE IN THE AREA OF BOTH NATIONAL AND FOREIGN ARMED FORCES.

23. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THIS PLAN IS ASSUMPTION OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE BY ALL THE 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THE VIENNA TALKS. CONSEQUENTLY, EACH PARTY TO THE REDUCTION PROGRAMME WOULD KNOW EXACT TERMS OF REDUCTIONS TO BE EFFECTED BY ALL OTHER PARTIES.

24. MR CHAIRMAN,  
WE CONSIDER THIS REVIEW OF THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST STATES TO THE COMPLEX PROBLEM OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO BE USEFUL AT THIS JUNCTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN FOUR SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS UNDERTAKE A NEW IMPORTANT INITIATIVE TO MOVE THE TALKS AHEAD.

25. I SHOULD LIKE NOW, ON BEHALF OF THE DELEGATIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND POLAND, TO PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING CONTENTS OF AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS TO THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TABLED BY OUR GOVERNMENTS ON 8 NOVEMBER 1973:

26. FIRST. THE REDUCTION IN 1975 BY 20 THOUSAND MEN ON EACH SIDE COULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A WAY ENVISAGED IN THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FOR THE  
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CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON INITIAL REDUCTIONS, VIZ.:

- TO CARRY OUT IN 1975 REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES /USA, BELGIUM, CANADA, FRG, LUXEMBURG, THE NETHERLANDS, UNITED KINGDOM/ AND OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES /USSR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR AND POLAND/ BY TOTAL NUMBER OF 20 THOUSAND MEN ON EACH SIDE WITH THE CORRESPONDING ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT;

- TO REDUCE THE FORCES OF THE USA AND THE USSR BY 10 THOUSAND MEN EACH AND, FOR INSTANCE, THOSE OF THE FRG AND POLAND BY 5 THOUSAND MEN EACH, AND TO DISTRIBUTE THE REMAINING 5 THOUSAND ON EACH SIDE AMONG THE REMAINING STATES;

- IN THE COURSE OF 1975 TO CARRY OUT THE REDUCTION  
OF FORCES: OF THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE FIRST  
HALF OF THE YEAR AND OF THE REMAINING STATES IN THE  
SECOND HALF.

27. SECOND. IN 1976, WHEN ACCORDING TO THE DRAFT  
AGREEMENT OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ALL THE PARTI-  
CIPATING STATES REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES BY 5 PERCENT,  
THE FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA WOULD BE REDUCED  
IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR AND THOSE OF THE RE-  
MAINING STATES IN THE SECOND HALF.

28. AS TO 1977, THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMA-  
MENTS BY 10 PERCENT IS IMPLEMENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY ALL COUNTRIES.  
THIS MODE, TO BE APPLIED AT THE FINAL STAGE OF THE OVERALL  
REDUCTION, IS FULLY LOGICAL AND JUSTIFIED SINCE AT THAT TIME  
EACH PARTICIPANT OF THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT ALL  
THE REMAINING STATES ALSO IMPLEMENT THE UNDERTAKEN OBLIGATIONS.

29. MR CHAIRMAN,  
THE AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS WHICH THE FOUR SOCIALIST  
COUNTRIES ARE NOW SUGGESTING TO THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT OF  
8 NOVEMBER 1973 ARE INDEED IMPORTANT.

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
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30. I SHOULD PARTICULARLY STRESS THE POINT THAT THESE AMENDMENTS HAVE NOT IN ANY MEASURE BEEN CAUSED BY THE REVISION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE STILL CONSIDER THE ORIGINAL SOLUTIONS PROPOSED IN OUR DRAFT TO BE JUST AND MORE CONSEQUENT.

31. THE REASON WHY WE PROPOSE THESE AMENDMENTS IS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOME WESTERN VIEWS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. HAVING ENCOUNTERED IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS THE WESTERN OPPOSITION TO THE FOUR-POWER DRAFT AND THE WESTERN INSISTENCE ON AN UNACCEPTABLE SCHEME OF REDUCTION, WE TRIED TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD THROUGH THE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL OF A SEPARATE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP IN 1975. BEHIND THIS PROPOSAL WAS A DEFINITE INTENTION TO START MOVING TOWARDS SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. WE ARE NOW

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MAKING A STEP FURTHER, AND A MAJOR STEP FURTHER. WE PROPOSE AMENDMENTS WHICH INCORPORATE INTO OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT THE RESULTS OF THE DEBATES, BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL, HELD ON THE CONCEPT OF INITIAL REDUCTIONS. WE SERIOUSLY EXPAND THE MEASURE OF OUR FLEXIBILITY WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS IN 1976.

32. THUS, BOTH IN 1975 AND EVEN MORE IN 1976, I.E. DURING TWO OUT OF THREE STAGES OF REDUCTIONS PROPOSED IN OUR DRAFT, WE WOULD BE FOLLOWING A PATTERN OF REDUCTIONS WHICH TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT MEETS THE WESTERN POSITION.

33. TO FULLY BRING HOME THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS, I WOULD, IN PARTICULAR, EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

34. FIRST. AS YOU KNOW, IT HAS ALL ALONG BEEN THE OPINION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THAT IN ORDER TO BEST COPE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF MUTUALITY, EQUITY AND EQUIVALENCE OF REDUCTIONS, THE 11 STATES WHO AS DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THESE TALKS WOULD TAKE PART IN THEM, SHOULD ALL DO IT RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING AND SIMULTANEOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS. WE HAVE EXPLAINED WHY IT SHOULD BE SO.

35. AT THE SAME TIME WE HAVE OPPOSED AS UNFOUNDED THE

WESTERN DEMAND FOR PRECEDING BY THE REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US FORCES THOSE OF THE OTHER ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA. WE STILL CONSIDER THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS BACK THIS DEMAND WITH MOTIVES WHICH ARE EXTRANEOUS TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES.

36. HOWEVER, THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES HAVE MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE WESTERN VIEWS ON THE SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS. IN DEFERENCE TO THOSE VIEWS WE FIRST AGREED IN OCTOBER LAST TO HAVE PRIOR REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES IN 1975 UNDER OUR PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. NOW WE WOULD INCORPORATE THIS ORDER OF REDUCTIONS FOR 1975 INTO OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT AND FOLLOW IT ALSO IN THE SECOND STAGE OF OUR THREE-YEAR REDUCTION PROGRAMME.

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37. BOTH IN 1975 AND IN 1976 OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD CARRY OUT THEIR REDUCTIONS ONLY WHEN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

38. SUCH ARRANGEMENT, INDEED, FITS IN WITH THE OFTEN EXPRESSED WESTERN WISH THAT COMPLETION OF PRIOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS SHOULD PROVIDE AN ASSURANCE FOR THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, TO ENABLE THEM STARTING REDUCTIONS.

39. WHILE OFFERING THIS COMPROMISE SOLUTION THE FOUR SPONSORS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS HAVE ALSO TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THE LONG DEBATE HERE ON THE QUESTION WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE BEGINNING. WE ONCE ALL AGREED THAT SOLVING THIS QUESTION WAS CRUCIAL TO PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE WE HAVE NOW PROVIDED THE COMPROMISE AND REALISTIC ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

40. SECONDLY, IN THE COURSE OF TO-DATE DEBATES THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ABUNDANTLY CLARIFIED WHY THEY FEEL JUSTIFIED IN ASKING FOR REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONATE TO MILITARY CAPABILITIES POSSESSED BY EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN THE AREA. GIVEN THE COMPLEX CHARACTER OF THESE CAPABILITIES AND DIFFERENT IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS NATIONAL AND FOREIGN COMPONENTS IN THE TOTAL POTENTIAL OF THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY ALLIANCES, SUCH METHOD OF REDUCTION IS MOST SATISFACTORY IN ASSURING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE.

41. BUT HERE, TOO, SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE SHOWN GOOD WILL AND AGREED TO MAKE A SERIOUS CHANGE IN THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO MEET THE WESTERN VIEWS. SO, UNDER THE AMENDED DRAFT AGREEMENT IT IS THE TWO POWERS,

THE USSR AND THE USA, THAT WOULD HAVE THE LARGEST SHARE IN  
THE REDUCTIONS OF THE FIRST STAGE, IN 1975.

42. AS FAR AS 1976 IS CONCERNED, SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION  
OF THE SOVIET FORCES WILL BE EFFECTED BEFORE OTHER  
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, NOTABLY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN,  
ARE CALLED ON TO START REDUCING THEIR FORCES.

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43. THIRDLY, THE SPONSORS OF THE NEW PROPOSALS, WHICH  
MARKEDLY DEPART FROM THEIR ORIGINAL ONES, WISH TO DRAW THE  
ATTENTION OF THE WESTERN STATES TO THE IMPORTANCE OF TREATING

THESE PROPOSALS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL REDUCTION PROGRAMME, AS PART OF THIS PROGRAMME. IN THIS WAY WE INTEND ONCE AGAIN TO STRESS OUR PRIMARY INTEREST FOR ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, TO FOCUS OUR DEBATE ON THIS CENTRAL QUESTION. THE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS ARE IN OUR VIEW NECESSITATED BY AND COMMENSURATE WITH THE EXPECTED CONSOLIDATION OF THE TREND FOR DETENTE IN THE COMING YEARS.

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44. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT BY INCORPORATING THESE IMPORTANT COMPROMISE SUGGESTIONS INTO OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT ON OVERALL REDUCTION WE PROVIDE THE JUST ANSWER TO THE CONCERN THAT SOME OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH OUR PARTIAL PROPOSALS, I.E. ABOUT THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS. THIS FINAL OUTCOME STANDS CLEAR FROM THE AMENDED DRAFT AGREEMENT IN RESPECT OF SIZE, TIMING AND METHOD OF REDUCTIONS, BOTH GENERAL - BY ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, AND INDIVIDUAL - BY EACH OF THEM.

45. IN THE VIEW OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IS OUR CENTRAL TASK AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS WHICH WE HAVE JUST PRESENTED ARE MEANT TO FACILITATE THIS TASK AND ACCELERATE ACCORD.

46. FOURTHLY, I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT BY TABLING OUR NEW PROPOSALS, WE DO NOT FORSAKE THE ONE MADE LAST OCTOBER FOR A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. ONE CERTAINLY SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THE VALUE OF INITIAL AND PARTIAL SOLUTIONS. ALSO THE PROPOSAL OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES, MADE IN NOVEMBER - DECEMBER LAST, CONCERNING THE JOINT DECLARATION OF THE COMMITMENT BY 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOT TO INCREASE THEIR ARMED FORCES MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, REMAINS FULLY VALID. THESE TWO PROPOSALS ARE PARALLEL TO THE ONE WE HAVE JUST PUT FORWARD. TAKEN TOGETHER, THEY PROVE CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THEY ARE ALL DICTATED BY OUR INTEREST TO REACH AGREEMENT, TO BRING ABOUT MILITARY DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS RANGE OF PROPOSALS OFFERS TO THE WESTERN STATES THE CHOICE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE.

47. HAVING INDICATED THE NATURE AND THE EXTENT OF COMPROMISE IN OUR NEW PROPOSALS, I SHOULD MAKE A POINT TO STRESS THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES APPROACH CONTINUES TO BASE ITSELF ON THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS: THOSE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, MUTUALITY AND EQUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE CONSIDER THAT THE FLEXIBILITY IN THE MATTER OF SEQUENCE AND PROPORTIONS OF REDUCTIONS IS POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREE TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC REDUCTION

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OBLIGATIONS. ONLY THIS WOULD GIVE EVERY PARTICIPANT THE AWARENESS AND THE ASSURANCE AS TO THE MAGNITUDE AND TIMING OF REDUCTIONS BY ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS. THIS INDEED IS A BASIC REQUIREMENT AND THE ONE GENERALLY ACCEPTED IN THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

48. MR CHAIRMAN,  
I HAVE PRESENTED THE IMPORTANT NEW PROPOSALS OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. I HAVE EXPOUNDED THE SPONSORS HIGH MOTIVES BEHIND THEM. PERMIT ME TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS WILL TAKE THESE PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY, APPRECIATE THE CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT IN THEM, AND - MORE IMPORTANT - THAT THEY WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO RECIPROCATE THIS INITIATIVE SO THAT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS CAN BE ARRIVED AT AND REAL PROGRESS SOON OBTAINED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXT.RESOR

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## Message Attributes

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**Decapton Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
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**Executive Order:** GS  
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**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 02 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <02 APR 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <02 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
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**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006